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KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET SPEECH AND THE AFTERMATH

Donnalee Rowe
History Honors Thesis
February 5, 1964

Three years after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev presented
before the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, a secret
speech, condemning Stalin and the development of the cult of the
individual around him.

In so doing, he promised to return to the

Marxist-Leninist principles and to collective leadership.

I shall try,

in this paper, to summarize the various changes that have occurred
within the years succeeding the speech.

I shall try to show that

there has been no basic change in the Soviet system of government,
but that some controls have been relaxed and the method of control has
been changed to reflect Khrushchev's personality.

March 5, 1953, marks a turning point in the history of Thlssia.
On this date Stalin died, ending a quarter-century of rule by a
dictator, and beginning the rule of the collective in an easier
atmosphere • 1

The official announcement of his death revealed the

seriousness of the event.
Our task is to guard • • • the steel-like and monolithic
unity of the pa.rty as the apple of our eye • • • rand to
maintain] high political vigilance, irreconcilability
and stalwartness in the struggle against inner and outer
foes • • • • The most important task of the party and the
government is to insure uninterrupted and correct
leadership, • • • the greatest unity of leadership and 2
the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic • • • •
In this time of crisis, words of assurance would seem more appropriate
but instead the alarmwas sounded.
An examination of the system which had been ruled by Stalin will
reveal the cause for concern.

Through numerous purges, Stalin had

set up a pennanent dictatorship based on fear.
the suspicious nature of the dictator.
narian and ruled with an iron hand.
of Soviet life.

The fear stemmed from

Stalin was a strict discipli-

He tried to regulate all phases

He regarded an/deviation, or appearance of deviation,

as a threat to his personal authority and had it quickly repressed.
The instrument of regulation was the organization of secret police.
There were no legal guarantees to the citizen and the police could
make arbitrary arrests, accusations, and carry out executions.
Torture was permitted so in most cases there was a "confession" to
support the execution; mock trials were possible also.
1

2

It was a dictatorship which waged war on its own people but it
seemed to thrive on hatred and suspicion.3 Under Stalin's direction,
Russia had made tremendous advances in the fields of science and
industry.

He had carried the Soviet Union from an industrially.

backward nation to a contender for world power.

The important men

under Stalin achieved their high position because he placed them
there--a result of their ability to praise him and follow along his
policies without arousing his suspicion, rather that their capabilities
as leaders.

The men who had demonstrated the qualities of leadership

and independent thought had been purged in the early years after the
revolution, and mediocre men, whom Stalin could manipulate replaced
them.
With the death of Stalin, a sensitive situation developed because,
in a·: permanent dictatorship, there is no legi time.ta successor, yet
4
government apparatus calls for another dictator.

On March 5, the

collective began the task of attempting to rule as a gro_µp over a
system built for absolute dictatorship.

The position of dictator

remained open and the collective struggled for individual power.
The period from 1953 to 1956 marks the steady ascendency of
Khrushchev to power.

On March 6, 1953, Malenkov was the most prominent

member of the collective.

He had been close to Stalin throughout his

rule and seemed to be his logical successor.

Also, like Stalin, he

was the First Secretary of the Party and the Prime Minister in the
government.

Beria was the other apparent contender for power within

the collective.

The head of the Secret Police, he had a great

potential to establish his rule by force and continue along the

3

same line as Stalin.

Khrushchev was the least of the collective.

In one of its first acts,, the members of the collective combined
to destroy Beria.

He was arrested quickly and executed ·in December,

1953 in a manner reminicent of Stalin.

Malenkov was forced to resign

his position as Party Secretary in the early weeks of the collective
and Khrushchev replaced him in September.

Because of Malenkov's

prestige, he retained his influence in policy matters until February,
1955 when he was forced out of the government completely.
Khrushchev's foil, replaced him.

Bulganin,

The collective had worked to maintain

a balance of power within it, and, in so doing, Khrushchev had been able
inc9nspicuoµs1y_:l;u increase his power until by 1956 there seemed to be
•

no one who could seriously challenge his power.
The policies of this period are confusing.

5

They vacillated

between a more liberal rule and the traditional Stalinist lirre--an
indication of the power struggle going on behind the scenes.

There

was one consistent feature throughout this entire period •. Khrushchev,,
as head of the Party apparatus, continued to s'1bstitute his proteg~s
in government and Party positions. 6
in death. 7

Stalin's spirit.was strong, even

His personality had given Russia its· characteristics and,

however the people felt about him, whether love or hatred, it was an
intense feeling and always mixed with fear. 8

The rule_ of the collective·

called for a drastic change in the government machirier_;1, and, in putting
·~f.t:S~·

policies into effect, they had to cope with this emotional state

of the people.

Immediately after Stalin's death, an, atmosphere of

greater freedom was introduced probably because of the insecurity of

the collective.
granted.

Malenkov announced increased food and consume rs I goods.

The Doctors
'

Amnesty for military and criminal prisoners was

P~ot,

created by Stalin to initiate another purge, was
:;.·9:

repudiated as false. / ·The censorship was reduced and the resulting
thaw in literature was important particularly in awaking the intelligentsia.
Arrun Khachaturian, writing a critical review in 1953, stated:
• • • The musical authorities must desis't from the harmful
practice of interi'ering in the artistic activities of the
composer. Creative Pf8blems cannot be solved by
bureaucratic methods·.
At approximately the srune time W. Pomerantsev wrote in the Novy Mir:
''Honesty is what in my opinion is 1 acking in some of our books and
plays • • • • Insincerity is not necessarily the same as lying, for
1111
.
.
. a '1 so insincere.
'
is
s t i. lt e d ness
In late 1954, a reversal of this liberal trend was seenoand
Khrushchev used the Se.cond Soviet Vlriters Congress to remind the

'

writers in no uncertain terms of their obligation to the Party.

12

Another. Stalinist policy vvhich Khrushchev retrieved in Jenuary, 1955
stressed the priority of heavy industry in direct contradiction to
13
Malenkov, foreshadoi.ring his 'eclipse in February of the same yea.r.
In these early weeks of 1955 Khrushchev seemed to seek authority through
his close associatio,n with Stalin, believing that the Stalin image
might confer legitimacy.

A biographical article written in this period

called Khrushchev' 1'one of the closest comrade-in-arms of J. V. Stalin. "1 4
And, as late as December

?l, 1955, Pravda honored Stalin's birthday

which had passed igriored in 1954.

15

5

The inconsistency in policy could not last, nor could a trend
away from Stalinism conti nuo in silence:

The decention of Stal in' s

infallibility caused consternation among the people over policy changes
by the collective.

Stalin's image had been built too high and the

collective was now dwarfed by it.

The relaxation of controls necessary

to stop the stagnation of fussia, both culturally and economically,
involved many elements:

the struggle for power at the top and the

Party intrigues, pressure from the masses for better living conditions
and the craving among the educated for more freedom. 16

This then was

the situation which the collective faced· at the opening of the
Twentieth Party Congress of February 14, 1956.

Its answer was the

secret speech delivered by Khrushchev the last night of Congress;

t~

showed that none had the power to fill the dictator's shoes; and,
required that the collective be maintained, at least in name, to share
equally in the responsibility.
crisis of Stalin's death.

The· leaders had survived the first

Now came the crucial test.

6

The Twentieth .Party Congress was opened by Khrushchev at 10:00 a.m.
February 14,, J956.

Attending were 1, 355 delegates with voting status,

.;P

and 81 delegates with consultative status.
Communist parties also were represented.

17

Delegates from 55 foreign
Within eleven days,

eighty-five speeches were delivered, most of which dealt with the $tate
18
.
of the· Soviet Union. ·

Of importance is the fact that in these speeches

.were announced no basic changes from past policies.
·the policies were reaffinned.

On the contrary,,

In his ·Report of the Central Committee,,

Khrushchev stated:
• • • The Com.~unist Party of the Soviet Union has always
manifested and continues to manifest concern for the
preponderant development of heavy industry which is the
foundation for the growth of all branches of the
·
socialist economy,, for raising our country's defense
potential and for improving the people's well-being. 19
Agricultural policies extended the Stalinist line even further with
20
the reduction.of ~he number of collective farms by increasing their size.
In the. same speech Khrushchev called for a restoration of Party

norms, condemned the ,"turning on one or· another leader into a miracleworking hero, at the same time belittling the role of the Party and the
masses and tending to reduce their creative effort. 1• 21

He was

followed in later speeches by Mikoyan and Malenkov,, both condemning the
cult which ,"at a certain period. inflicted great harm on the cause of
22
the leadership of ·the Party and the country. n
A fevr d·ays la.ter on February 25, 1956, a surprise closed session of
. ·23
.
Congress was called. . Only the 1,,355 delegates with vote attended.
These were 'allowed to take no notes, only to listen and to berKhrushchev' s
sounding bo.ard.

24 . In this atmosphere Khrushchev delivered the speech

7

denouncing the cult of Stalin.
Sovie~

This speech was not published in the

Union nor anywhere until the United States State Department

·published it on June 4, 1956 •.25
Al though Khrushchev declared that the purpose of his speech was
to show how the cult grew, he devoted more time to a criticism of
Stalin. 26

He based his criticism on three facts:

(1) Stalin's

personality defects, (2) Stalin's purges of Communists, and (3) Stalin's
faulty war leadership.
To point out the defects, he compared the personalities of Stal in
and Lenin.

Lenin only "tried to persuade; he patiently explained his

opinions to others.

Lenin always diligently saw to it that the norms of

Party life were realized, that the Party statutes were enforced, that
the Party Congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions took place
27
at the proper intervals."

This is contrasted to Stalin who had

displayed none of these qualities.

Khrushchev further stated that

Lenin had recognized these deficiencies as evidenced by Lenin's
28
"testament" which he read in part:
Stiilin is too rude, and this failing, which is quite
tolerable in our midst- and in relations among us Communists,
becomes intolerable in the office of Secretary-Gene ral.
Therefore, I propose to the Comrades that they think of a .
way of removing Stalin from this post and appointing it to
another person who in all other re?:pects differs from · ·
Comrade Stalin in one advantage a.lone, namely., that he be
more tolerant, more loyal, more courteous and 2~re
considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc.
With reference to his criticism of Stalin's purges of Communists
he stated:
It was precisely during this period (1935-37-1938) that
the practice of mass repression through the state apparatus
was born, first against the enemies of Leninism • • • --and

8

subsequently also against many honest Communists • • • •
Stalin originated the concept ''enemy of the people'' • • • •
This term made possible the use of the most cruel repression,
viola.ting all norms of revolutionary legality • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
f.stalin made] an attempt at theoretical justification of the
mass terror policy under the pretext that class war mus~
0
allegedly sharpen as we march forward toward socialism.
Khrushchev proved his point by citing numerous cases in which good,
honest Communists were falsely accused yet died still loyal to the
Party, nand Stalin doubtless knew of them." 31
Khrushchev claimed that Stalin as a war leader was completely
incapable.

He was unprepared for the German attack a. lthough he had

received ample warning.

"Even after the war began, the nervousness

and hysteria. which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual
1132
military operations, ca.used our anny serious da.mage.

Khrushchev

asserted that he knew what was needed to further the war effort but
was hindered by Stalin's stupidity.

He further claimed that he had

gone so far as to stand up for Zhukov when Stalin criticized his
military ability. 33

Stalin used the war to build up his own image:

• • • In various ways he tried to implant among the
people the fiction that all victories gained by the
Soviet people during the great patriotic war were due to
the courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one
else • • • • We must state that after the war the situation
became even more complicated. Stalin became even more
capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular, his
suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable
dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his
very eyes. After the war Stalin separated himself from the
collective even more. He decided everything a.lone, without
any consideration for anyone or a.nything. 34

9

"How

Finally Khrushchev arrived at the most relevant point:
could it .be [according to the tenents of Marxism-Leninisri!) ?''

He did

not answer the rhetorical question but merely stated:
In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner
only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized
by the cult of the individual leader, only by those who do
not understand the essence of the revolution and of the
Soviet state • • • • 35
He then asked:

~!![here

were the members of the Political Bureau of the

Central Committee?"3 6 According to Khrushchev, in the context of time
and place in which they made their decisions, they failed to recognize
Stalin's deficiencies because initially he had been a capable Marxist
leader.

By the time his abuses were seen it was too late.

"Attempts

to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent
.

falling victim of the repressions."

37

No plenary sessions were

convened so there was no chance of unity to take a stand against
Stalin.

But "we cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot"

for Stalin was convinced that all this was necessary for the defense
of the working people. 38

"In this lies the whole tragedy. 11 39

Khrushchev's guarantee to Congress is this:

"In order not to repeat

errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely
against the cult of.the individual leader. • • • 1140

He.closed with

the explanation for the need of secrecy:
We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition
to the enemy, we should not wash our dirty linen before
their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress
will understand and assess all these proposals properly . . .
Long live the victorious banner of our party--Leninism! 41

10

At first glance the speech appears to be a candid revelation,
indicating the best of intentions.

Yet on closer examination the

speech is a most revealing indictment of the entire Soviet system
including the present leaders.

Khrushchev raised the question "How

could it be?" and, by not answering it, revealed the need for an
investigation of the entire system.

He did not even attempt to answer

it but turned on the questioner with the accusation of being ''blinded
and hopelessly hypnotized.'•

Instead of analyzing political, social and

economic roots, Khrushchev used an un-Marxist explanation in stressing
the deficiencies in Stalin's character. 42

This ideal of a personality

being so important is foreign to Marx who stated that it was the time
and place that determined the character of the individuai. 43

According

to Marx's theory, then, one could question·the desirability for such
a system calling for a Stalin.

Khrushchev's answer is that there was a

deviation from the Marxist principles which developed.:iinto the cult of
the individual.

Now all of the evil of the society could be attributed

to Stalin's exceptional defects.

The question of how the Soviet society
.
.
.
4
could depart from its path t o such a .point of degeneration was bypassed.~
Where were the members of the Politburo?

A review of their

activities preceding the death of Stalin would reveal that they were
busy building up the cult of Stalin.

On Stalin's 70th birthday,

December 21, 1949, Khrushchev closed a speech with:

nGlory to our

dear father, wise teacher, the genius leading the rarty, the Soviet
people and the working people of the whole world, Comrade Stalin!"

45

This statement was made after the war which Khrushchev claimed that

11

Sta.lin ha.d so badly managed.

The circumstances were such, according

to Khrushchev, tha.t the collective could not do anything.

But was

such apparent whole-hearted praise necessary or was this deceiving the
people to s a.ve his neck?

However, from the speech one wonders why

the collective could not do anything.
Khrushchevwas right in his indignation at the mass killing and
deportation of people.

"Not only no Marxist-Leninist, but also no man

of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations
responsible for inimical activity • • • • 't46
Politburo members when this occurred?

Yet where were the

The members knew tha.t they

would fall in any attempt to expose these gi'ourl.dless suspicions.

Also,

because of Stalin's popularity, the people would not have believed them,
and rallied to the support of Stalin.
labor camps and prisons?

But who filled the numerous

Surely, these and Khrushchev's men "of common

sense'' would have come to the support of the collective.
Khrushchev claimed that Stalin, incapacitated during the early
stage of the war had let some power slip from his ha.nds.

Why did the

Politburo members, recognizing by this time his deficiencies, return
this power?
not valid.

Khrushchev's claim of ignorance as a plea for innocence is
He contradicts himself by showing his awareness of Stalin's

faults during the war.

Even if the claim were valid it serves as an

accusation in itself, for they could not seriously call themselves
lea.de rs when such major events were going on without their knowledge.
Thus, Khrushchev opened up a case for the indictment of the collective.

12
He recognized this and warned the Congress:
dirty linen before their eyes."

'twe should not wash our

De-Sta.linizing as quietly as possible

was their only course, for they, as heirs· to Stal in, 'and owing their
positions to him, were deeply compromised too. 47
In this speech, Khrushchev was concerned only with the crimes
against the party members.

This removed the responsibility of larger

48
crimes from the Party and enabled tilt::: to implicate Stalin individually.
The failure to include other crimes in his speech becomes more
significant when he attributed them by implication to the positive role
of Stalin.

Among the greatest of these were the mass repressions of the

11
Kulaks, the true "enemies of Leninism, the partition of Poland, and

the purges of nclass" enemies.

The crimes that a.re mentioned are of

such magnitude that they warrant a stronger· indictment than "the tragedy"
of Stalin.

Stalin ha.d fashioned the Soviet Regime, in the name of the

working class, under the theory of developing a. Communistic state.

The

state (the Communist experiment) and the dicta.tor were insepara~le.
By calling Stalin to a·ccount, Khrushchev is placing the entire experiment
in a precarious position.
personal tragedy.

Yet he chooses to label this development a

This is an important contradiction of the speech for

it indicates that Khrushchev does not consider the system at fa.ult-only its founder.
The speech is filled with small discrepancies and distortions, a .
strategy similar to that used by Stalin.

Khrushchev was not consistent

in his condemnation of Stalin as deviating from Leninism.

Lenin's

"testament" was a.n appeal for collectivity as well es a characterization
of Stalin.

Lenin desired to increase the membership of the Central

13

Committee :bi order to a.void a split between Stalin and Trotsky.
Trotsky, he felt, had outstanding abilities and was the most able
among the ;members.

But Khrushchev approved of the removal of TrotsbJ and

his followers, a move definitely against Lenin's wish.

Khrushchev

credited Stalin with having invented the tenn "enemy of the people," but
it had been used by Lenin in 1917 when he prepared the law outlawing
11
the Kadet Party, :"the party of ,the enemies of the people. 49

He

accused Stalin of incorrectly interpreting Lenin in urging class war.
Though class war was necessary at the beginning, Stal in· used the term
as a justification for extenninating Communist political opposition
after class war should have ceased.
in ,rn34,

After the war was ilio longer~needed

hmvevei-, Khrushchev, himself, had called for "the final annilation

50
of the class ,enemies • • • •

Khrushchev's guarantee against the rise of another dictator is
questionable. ·He seemed to be trying to prove that the existence of
the collective leadership was adequate insurance.
limits

pl~ced

With no practical

on the acquisition of power, however, and Khrushchev's

apparent ascendency, no reasonably intelligent person could take this
guarantee seriously.

Instead, the speech µ-oved the need for a representative

government~ba?ed on fundamental political liberties, and a need for a

check on the authority of the le a.de rs.

Khrushchev, in his presentation

of the speech, had substituted the cult of Lenin for the cult of Stalin
which he could interpret as needed.

14
Although the speech opened up many questions, Khrushchev had
sufficient control over the· situation for the presen.t.
From the point of view of immediate ·politic al :{eali ty
there was, for every sentence that Khrushchev,':.had spoken.
an emergency exit; for fYery floodga.te he had' opened,.
there was a nearby drun~ in every promise he had made, there
was an implied th ree.t. 1
Effective control could not be practiced in a democracy, but Khrushchev
still had the same basic weapons as Stalin.· . Coupled with this he had
an acute political sense as to how far he could go in she.king up the
Soviet people. 52

15

With Stalin's death, the collective
problems.

1fta:c'.'ecd~:':tremendous,·

'· '"

It had taken .'over a bureaucracy not suited to control by

a collective end was insecure in this position.
problems which celled for inunediate action.

It was faced with

In some instances the

action taken was contradictary to the Stalinist policy, viz., the
healing of the breach between Ti to' s Yugoslavia e.nd Russia.
collective had a di:lemna:

The

its authority derived from Stalin necessitated

the maintenance of his.infallibility, yet there had to be e. change.
Alongside were the pressures that were building up from the people.
The masses had been controlled by brute force and the use of fear for
twenty-five years.

After Stalin's death there was a sigh of relief and

. . t•ion. 53
an atmosp h ere of ant icipa

Hope rose to a high pitch.

The

collective had immediately destroyed the power of the secret police in
1953 in order to secure its position and, in so doing, had broken

down the wall holding back the people.

It was an irrevocable step.

By discrediting Stalin's policies it could also charge him with the
failures and then proceed in the name of progress.

This is the major

reason for the speech--the use of Stalin es a scapegoat.

The oollective's,

and particularly Khrushchev's, rise to power demanded that these crimes
not be repeated. 54

To give this guarantee, the group had to become

the chief anti-Stelinists.

Whether or not they originated the movement

is a moot question and is not" particularly relevant in the succeeding
events.

By his degradation, then, it was rid of the "millstone of

Stalin's heritage," and could' carry out reforms reversing his policies. 55
The collective now had the added power to define the limits of the
anti-Stalin campaign and it.gave them a basic ideology that they could
fashion to meet any situation.

')6

"'
There were other-benefits to be gained from de-Stelinization. The

army hed renewed status due .to the rehabilitation of so many officers.

56

Foreign relations were eased with a new approach of "peaceful
coexistence."

57

A new history could be written, without Stalinist

distortions, which would have more historical accuracy.

With freer

contact with the Western world, the people could be roused from their
cultural lethargy. 58
Khrushchev realized that the implications of the speech would
reflect on him and the rest of the collective.

He must have

this could cause a serious questioning of the Soviet system.
he take the risk?
could have been.

kno~m

that

Tuby did

In actuality the risk does not seem es great as it
The infallibility of the Party suffered a severe blow;

the influence of ideology and Party leadership to direct the thoughts of
the people dime'hished.5 9

But leadership had been impossible before with

I

"Stalin Is gho'st still hovering so closely overhead and still attracting
·

.

huge quantities o f emotional energy, ranging from love to hate • • • •

n60

By ridding themselves of Stalin's ghost, they could hope to give some
Tpis gave Khrusuchev more status because he

authority to their power.

was identified as the: leader, and was able to associate other names,
.'

·'

.

particularlyMalenkov's, with Stalin and his abuses.

Although there

were risks involved, de-Stalinization seems to be the only choice.
to step into the dictatorship.
one was strong enough
, ...
.
provoke the crisis, but brought it out into the open.
seriousness of the

~mplications

No

Khrushchev did not
61

Considering the

of the speech, the skillful manner in

which it was worded caused a minimum of disturbance.

17
The speech was an affinnation of a policy which had been developing
since March, 1953. · This policy of allowing more freedom had been
sporadic--it had been put forth and then quickly withdrawn at the first
sign of trouble.

The sp~ech was an indication of a more definite

policy, but its ambiguity leaves much to be desired as a policy
statement.

Of greater importance is the fact that the speech was actually

stated and now the people could think about it regardless of the
official interpretation.

As a result of this pseudo-liberal policy,

significant changes have occurred in every aspect of Soviet life and
the speech itself has caused additional pressure to carry these changes
further.
The most dramatic effects of the speech came with the events in
Poland and Hungary.

In these· couiltries, Stalin had never been the

father-figure, wonderful, yet terrible, and there was no numbing shock
at the revelation of Khrushchev.

62

After the Twentieth Party Congress,

there began to be open criticism of conditions led by the writers. 63

+

• • • There were among the elder generation of intellectuals
(especially of economists i,ri Poland and of imaginative
writers in Hungary) men who were Marxists, but had become
disillusioned with the ri~e, and who had the experience
and the ability to give~ead ~o the intellectual youth,
which was also against the rlgime, but inexperienced and
inarticulate. 64
There was widespread discontent in both countries.

The peasants

particularly, resisted collectivization and exploitation.65

The

workers were dangerous because of their concentration in cities.
speech occurred at a sensitive time:

The

it occurred at the most difficult

stage before the new institutions, introduced by the Soviets, had taken

18

root and the external pressure, combined with internal disorder,
brought the situatio_n to the breaking point. 66

Khrushchev, in healing

the breach with Yugoslavia, had declared that there was more than one
67
road to socialism, an opening grabbed by Hungary and Poland.

These

two countries had a special condition lacking in other Communist countries:
the discontent polarized around two leaders, Gomulka. in Poland and
Nagy in Hungary.

But with Hungary, Khrushchev made it clear that

another "Yugoslavia." was not possible and Soviet troops marched in,
seizing Hungary by force.

The justification sounded like it ca.me

directly from Stalin; the revolt was led by fa.cists who desired to
exploit the people under the "guise of false slogans of 'freedom and
independence.'"

The Soviet Union thus entered for the protection of

.
peep1 e. 68
the wor k ing

The leader, Prime Minister Nagy, was executed.

In Poland, events never reached the seriousness of Hungary.

The

security officers remained loyal to Gomulka., and Khrushchev, to avoid
69
war recognized him as the head.

Under his influence the collective

farms were dissolved, peasant 1 s taxes were lowered and an agreement
. 70
was made with the Catholic church which allowed fi':~':l more freedom.
The speech and the succeeding events, particularly in Hungary,
raised a cry from foreign Communist Parties.

The first reaction after

disbelief was a demand for further explanations.
.

In all the editorials

.

of the Communists~ papers, they pointed out that the "how" and "why'• was
not answered. These foreign Communists were able to:re.ise the questions
not admitted in Russia.

The June 6, 1956 U.S. Daily Worker wrote:

't'vVe do not consider the speech to be the last word on just how Stalin's
terror control came into existence and maintained itself for twenty

19
years and of the role of the other Communist leaders.tt
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Toglia.tti

of the Italian Communist party pointed out the same deficiency:
72
.
He
nThe true problems a.re evaded, which a.re how and why • • • • tt
found in the speech the need to go on their-own road and to try to find
a way of their own in order to avoid this peril.
Finally, on June 30, 1956, a few weeks after the United States
State Department's publication of the

speech~

the Central Committee of

the Soviet Union felt obliged to pass a resolution offering additional
explanations of the cult.

More than

Again the answers were vague.

half of the resolution was a tirade against the West for unjust
exploitation of the s itua.tion.
development of the cult:

The sane reasons were given for the

the threat of Western encirclement calling

for unity of the Party, the need for rapid industrialization, and
Stalin's great achievements.

73

Again the nfinn guarantees that such

phenomena as the personality cult will never again develop • • • • were
that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union • • • . • told the whole
truth no matter how bitter.''
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Then the assurance came that though

there were harmful aspects of the cult, the "correct path of development
75
.
toward Communismn was not hindered.

After four months, the collective

still was not able to develop a satisfactory answer.
Tito found in the speech a chance for more independence from
Moscow.

Criticizing the bureaucratic apparatus from which the dictatorship

stemmed, he accepted the Soviet leaders position that they were not at
fault, that it had been forced upon them.

In so doing, he assumed the

•

leadership for the independent line of Communist parties.

20

Comrades, that fight will be a hard and long one, for
what is at stake is nothing less than whether the new
line that began in Yugoslavia and which was in part
adopted in the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of
the C.P.S.U. shall triumph in Communist parties everywhere. The issue is whether this new line will win or
whether the old Stalinist line will again get the upper
hand.76
The speech had opened a flood of criticism from the Communist
parties.

Other countries within the bloc found it difficult to keep

the flood within its bounds.
.

Czechslovakia and Rumania.

'17

Labor lews had to be re1axed in
It gave a strong impetus for independence

of Communist parties from Moscow, led by Ti to and Togliatti •.
Particularly after the intervention in Hungary, mass resignations occurred
in the French and Italian parties; British, Swiss, Dutch and Danish.
78
Communist leaders faced serious problems within the pe;ty.

21
Politically, the Soviet Union has altered since the death of
Stalin.

The personality of Khrushchev, who likes people and enjoys

talking and mixing with them, has created a freer political atmosphere.

79

Of more importance in this development of a freer atmosphere is the
subjugation of the secret police to Party control.

No longer are there

any mass secret arrests and executions for political reasons.

The

labor camps have been emptied and thousands of people rehabilitated
posthumously.

With a reorganization of the concentration camp system,

two-thirds of the labor camps in Siberia were abolished, and today, (1957)
of the total prison population, only two percent are political prisoners. 80
The judicial system has been refonned though it is far from
independent of the executive-legislative branch of the government.Bl
Special tribunals used in the purges were abolished in April, 1956 and
investigative procedures were placed under judicial authority.

No

longer can a person be condemned solely on his personal confession.

The

elastic terms of ''enemies of the people" and "counter revolutionary
activity" are not written in the law and the concept of class war intensi-,
fying as the march goes on toward socialism is rejected.

However, there

are still formulas used by the executive-legislative branch to justify
arbitrary action such as, accusing a person or group of 'tconspiracy with
the aim of seizing power.•t 82

There is arbitral'"IJ use of punishment in

the parasite law in which citizens can vote an "unproductive" member out
of their communi•tY• 83

In this law, any group of citizens can call a

meeting to vote and the sentence of two to five years banishment can be
. i ty vo t e. 84
. 1e maJor
carried through wi t h a simp

11

The laws passed. • •

22
represent a compromise between the desire to achieve a rule of law on
the one hand and the interest of the party apparatus in

preset~ing

.
ascendency on th e other. " 85
its
In no law is the Party mentioned or its rights and powers defined,
but according to official statements, the Party is the supreme directing
force of the Soviet state.
the constitution. 86

Legal guarantees of citizens are missing in

Th~ power still lies in the Party apparatus of

which Khrushchev has firm control.
from that of Stalin.
of opinion.

The apparatus has a different flavor

There are debates within the Party and differences

A more educated group, people with university degrees,

have begun to replace the old Party members. 87
become more sensitive to public opinion. 88

The Party itself has

This has been necessary

with the lessened use of terror but has, at the same time, raised
Khrushchev's degree of popularity and mobilized the energy and loyalty
89
of the people behind him.
The Party numbers have increased rapidly.

Between 1952 and 1956

the Party membership rose one-third of a million; between 1956 and 1959,
it increased one million.

Khr.ushchev has extended the Party administrative

network into spheres, such as the collective farms, not formerly penetrated.
The government is strict but the people are accustomed to harsh laws.
They need, however, the security of a rational government, and this has
been partially achieved under Khrushchev.

Yet as the government becomes

more rational, there is a loss of ideological fervor.

This loss

a....~d

consequent weakening of the Party is a problem with which the leaders
have to contend.

90

the
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Other problems h~ve develop'ed since the de-Stal inization speech of
1956.

It is hard to determine the politics of a group when there is

one general spokesman, but it is evident .that major problems oocurred;;.
Khrushchev was discredited in 195'/ after the re vol ts in Hungary and
Poland broke out, and an "anti-Party group" rose up to oppose him.
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The rise of this oppos it:fon showed that Khrushchev still operated within
the Party apparatus and the collective, rather than above it.
not yet assumed the power which. Stalin possessed.

92

He had

The shifts and turns

in ..the policy were not a measure· of his arbitrary power but a measure
of the intensity of the political battle to sustain his authority.

93

The leaders of the opposition group were Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich.
A political .battle ensued, resulting in their expulsion by a Central
Corn.mi ttee resolution in July. 94

Khrushchev was able to defeat this

group with the help of Marshall Zhukov who linked the "anti-Party group"
....:

with the purges of 1938.

In a manner similar to Stalin, Khrushchev then

turned on Zhukov, forcing his resignation in October of that same year.95
He deviated from Stalin's methods by not killing his opponents.

They

were either exiled or relegated to a lower position of authority.
During this period of political strife, Khrushchev made a partial
retreat from his policy of de-Stalinization, claiming that "Stalinism
nor Stalin himself could be separated from Communism.n

96

He seemed to

try to go back to Stalinism to maintain control when threatened.

'This

enabled him to use more freely the methods of Stalin in crushing his
opponents.

Certainly, in Hungary, Khrushchev made a complete reversion

'to'. s;tal fn' ism•

The structu.re of his regime seems to be the same

24

but the style is different,- as reflected in the personalities of the
two men.

Khrushchev has retained full appointive and removal powers

and, with the fall of Zhukov, unquestioned control over the military.
U though disagreements occur, Khrushchev will not tolerate any persistent

97
.
pos t ure o f opposi•t'ion t o h'is po l'icies.

With the major political opposition crushed, Khrushchev has ultimate
authority.

A·cult has been developing around him.

This was particularly

evident in the Twenty-first Party Congress when no mention was
·of the collective.

made~c;

Khrushchev was gbr:}n special praise and thanked

personally for solving the problems of the Soviet Union. 98
thing occurred in the Twenty-second Party Congress.

The sa~e

At this Congress,

Khrushchev devoted a great deal of time to renewing his attack on the
anti-Party group and on the cult of Stalin.

Khrushchev attempted to

improve his public image by contrasting the successful and the
ostensibly benevolent aspects of his regime with conditions under
Stalin.
Khrushchev's bid for more power in the Twenty-second Congress we.s
only partially successful.

There are limits placed on Khrushchev

today that Stalin did not have.· The awakening of the public to
It is not yet a positive force,
99
The Soviet public is
but the potential is there and threatening.
political matters sets up a limit.

much more educated now.

This was necessary to achieve industrial

success, but it makes manipulation of the people more difficult.
Then, there exists in politics a point of no return in which pressure,
building up as a result of limited· concessions, could force Khrushchev

25

to yield more than he expected.

Khrushchev has not reached this point

as is evidenced by his vacillating policy of liberalization, but even
now, it would be practically impossible to return to strict Stal inism.
This serves to make Khrushchev cautious.

100

Khrushchev, himself, is a

product of the machine and cannot violate its fundamental tenents.
Through the machine he was able to achieve power and oniy through it
can he maintain this power.

Stalin created the machine and controlled

it, Khrushchev inherited the machine, and has to contend with it.

26
Probably the most persistent pressure that Khrushchev has

~aced

is from the intelligentsia and the rising number of educated people.
He has avoided the use of terror to such an extent that its reintroduction would bring disaster.

Consequently, he has to rely for the
Thus,

most part, on threats and Party pressure, a much weaker weapon.

with the risks lessened, the Soviet intelligentsia have begun to stir.
Imme"diately after Stalin's death, books were published anticipating
a freer expression.

This trend was sharply rebuked at the Second

Writers Congress in 1954.lOl

The .revolt of the literary conscience

102
recurred after the Twentieth Party Congress.

There was a rash of

literature which contained veiled attacks on the Soviet regime.
i~portant

An

book appearing in 1956 was Dudintsev's Not By Bread Alone.

This is the story of an inventor who cannot get his invention produced
due to the intrigue in the bureaucracy.

The inventor is favorably

contrasted with the objectionable Party man.

The novel sympathetically

depicts an individual who breaks away from the Party line and rises
above it.

It was not a literary work of any great magnitude, but it

roused the Soviet people and a great deal of discussion.

Khrushchev

attacked Dudintsev as a ncaluminiator who took malicious joy in
describing the negative sides of Soviet lifen and tagged the book as
103
He failed to explain why
"unhealthy, tendentious, and obnoxious. "
the book was so popular.

Dudintsev did not recant and wrote in March,

1957:
Surely it should be possible to let go of us, as
one does with beginners in the water, and to let us
swim on our own. We wouldn't drown. But, alas, I
am conscious all the time of the safety line, • • •
and it prevents me from swimming.104
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This safety line was the Party's attitude toward art, as disclosed in
1957.

In January of that year, the Party announced:

We are no friends of freedom as a thing in itself. We
are opposed to that kind of literary freedom which
strikes at the fundamental principles of loyalty to a
cause. The only freedom of thought we support is
freedom wibhin the framework of Marxist-Leninist
.
doctrine. 5
Khrushchev has made clear how far that framework extended.

The

artist was to have the task of faithfully illustrating the Party line.
After these attacks; several writers became silent ss a protest
to this contro1.

106

However, they were soon subdued and the novels

have again become colorless with a few important exceptions.

The book

causing the most stir was Boris Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago which received
the Nobel prize in 1958.

It was not allov1ed to be published in Russia.

The book showed Dr. Zhivago's complete disillusionment with the revolution
and his inclination to consider human life more important than the
revolution.

The Party branded Pasternak as a traitor and would allow

him to accept the prize only on threat of being exiled.
A\nother such book is the Yugoslavian Djilas', The New Class.
He, a Communist .. is dissatisfied with the existing "Communist" society
and he recognized the development of a Party
destroyed old one.

~ite

to replace the

He wrote:

The heroic era of Communism is past. The epoch of
its great leaders has ended. The epoch of practical
men has set in. The new class has been created. It
is at the height of its power and wealth, but it is
without new ideas. It has nothing more to tell the
people. The only thing that remains is for it to
justify itself. 107
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He had lived under the Communist regime long enough to recognize
In actuality, the leaders

the contradictions between f'act and theory.

They expected the state to

of the revolution of 1917 were betrayed.

The new class was

whither eway but instead the reverse occurred.

even worse than the previous one because it did not take root in the
life of the nation; the class consciousness, its origins in a political
party, developed before its political and economic power.
it made the structure to uphold

itself.-~.;Tnis

unity of belief and an iron discipline.

Consequently,

necessitated a strict

It drew into its ranks those

desiring to gain materially and repressed those with ideals.

It

established a monopoly in the name of the working class which was a
monopoly over it and the socialist ownership was a disguise for the
real ownership of the political bureaucracy.

108

Djilas briefly traces the development of modern Communism from
Marx, who did not prevent opposing ideas, to Stalin, who abolished
all deviation of any kind.

Khrushchev is the logical successor, an

9
'•apparently sincere, kind-hearted, non-intellectual 'man of the people. ,nl0
The new class is tired of purges and desires to live quietly.
are renouncing only the method and not the authori ty.llO

They

He condemns

the new class and sees no solution except its destruction.
When the new class leaves the historical scene--and
this must happen--there will be less sorrow over its
passing than there was for any other class before it.
Smothering everything except what suited its ego, i'h
has condemned itself to failure and shameful ruin.
These are men who lived, and were educated, under the Stalin
regime, yet whose perception did not dull.

It is these and men like

them who Khrushchev cannot manipulate--a fo:rmidable barrier.

29

Malcolm Muggeridge. a correspondent to Russia wrote:

"How remarkable

that Pasternak should have outlived Stalin and still been able to feel!
How ominous for the grisly band who have inherited the 'monstrous
,.112
.
machine' to which the Revolution gave rise.

Though he cannot

manipulate them, he can still control them because he has the power over
the press.
The educated are slow to come to the support of these men daring
to be individuals.

The old have spent most of their adult life, and

the young, their whole life, under the stifling influence of Stalin.
They turned away from politics and devoted their interests to other
fields.

Only in the last ten years have they begun to look on the

ideological framework as the limits, rather than the center, of their
113
world, partly a result of the downgrading of Stalin.

There is a

desire for free expression which is not an objection to poli tica.l
control, but to the pervasiveness of the controls.
in the extreme popularity of recent poets.

114

This. is evidenced

They attract huge crowds

to listen to their poetry which is a form of free expression.

One

of the poets best knmvn to the Western wqrld, is Yevtushenko.

His

poem nThe Heirs of Stal in" showed a great deal of insight into the
regime led by Khrushchev.

He wrote:

While the heirs of Stalin walk this eerth,
Stalin,
I fancy, still lurks in the mausoleum. 115
These intelligentsia. are easy to subdue and keep· in line for the
present, yet as more

beg~n

cannot long be the case.

to think along political lines, this
The lack of initiative on the part of the

30

intelligentsia is partly due to the educational, system;· The closer
a subject gets to politics, the less objective

i~ that subject taught. 116

Therefore, the people do not have the education needed. "·This is seen
particularly in the fields of law, philosophy, economy, and history.
The Merxist principles are taught as a ritual in these fields which
· hinders relevant education, whether it is believed or not.

117

For

the present there seems to be a. passive toleration of the Communist
doctrine but how much ectual absorption by thinking people is
questionable.

The writers,discipline themselves to the Party line but

at any relexation, speak out.

This happened in 1954.

Writers such as

Yevtushenko reveal their skepticism of the existing government but
still accept it fully.

Khrushchev recognized this situation and in.

1958 introduced a reform of the educational system.
placed on technical training.

Everyone attends eight

Emphasis was
y~ars

of school.

To get a. higher education one must work a certain a.mount of time in
a factory.

In the ideologically sensitive fields, the requirements are
'

'
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greatet, calling for more work and higher entrance qU:alifications.
History suffered with the frequent changes in Po.rty< line.

In

the secret speech, Khrushchev condemned Stalin's "Short Course" history
in which Stalin was made to appear the creator and prote,ctor of the
Soviet Union.

Though Khrushchev called for a better history, he still

looks at history in the same light as Stal in.

To

a French delegation

,,

in 1956, Khrushchev stated:

"Historians a.re dangerous people.

are capable of upsetting everything.

. 119
They must be directed."

They

31
At present, there is e. difference in Party history, 'for two features
have been added:

"The liquidation of the hannful consequences of the

cult of personality • • • [end) the recording-of the substantial beginnings
of a. new cult(of Khrushche;j ." 12 0
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Has there been a change in Russia?

Ifa_s there been a return to

Marxist principles as proclaimed in the secret speech of 1956?

Ten

years have passed since Stalin's death and with these years many changes
have been made.

Most a re the normal changes which must occur if a

society is to develop at all.

There has to be greater artistic

freedom if it does not become completely stagnated.

A nation which

produced such great literary figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries would have to be sensitive to this leek in the twentieth
century.

In saving itself, the collective destroyed the Secret Police

and therefore had to alter the judicial system to fit 'the circumstances.
There has been a change in type of control.

An easier and more

rational atmosphere exists today in Russia.

This type of control is

more efficient and easier to maintain than that of Stalin which
demanded constant vigilance.

The changes

ste:mm~dfrom

expediency and

not from a sincere belief in reforin on the part of the collective
and le_te r, Khrushchev.
In its basic structure, the Soviet Union is no different than it
was during Stalin's lifetime.

It remains a totalitarian government

with Khrushchev at the helm; he retains the same methods of control with
the exception of the Secret Police; there is no freedom of speech
al though the cont:r:-ol is exercised wi fu more moderation.

Khrushchev

has been able to defeat his political opposition and manipulate the
Russian people.

33

The changes which have occurred could lead to
the totalitarian system but this is not likely.
optimistic view.
system states:

It

!3.

break-up of

Some writers take an

Djilas in ending his condemnation of the Communist
'

'·"· '

In, any cese, the world will change e,nd will go on in.

the direction in which it has been moving and must go on--toward
greater unity, progress and freedom."

121

However, changes, such es

in the educational system, will keep flare-ups under control.

Whether

or not the changes will be of any great significance depends on a
people who are well known for their ability to put up with harsh
governments and who are slow to change.

With a history of personal

rulers, the majority of Russians "have a deep hankering efter a
stern, remote father figure, standing high above the hurly-burly of
l'f
.
or d inary
i e. 11122

Crankshaw feels that Khrushchev has the qualities

which go along with such a figure.
After that experience (Pr seeing Khrushchev out of
publi~ I found it never again possible to see the
characteristic, ebullient, and noisey Khrushchev
without being acutely conscious of the still centre
?f Y°22 man who knew what he wanted and was getting
l

t.

.

Through Khrushchev's practical leadership, the people have had more of
their material needs satisfied.

They are no longer afraid and conse-

quently live in an atmosphere of apparent freedom.

The shared desire

of the Party emd the. people to raise the standards of living has
relaxed tensions.
During the
prospects,
rapidly in
which 'will

decade of the 1960's we shall, under present
be dealing with a Soviet system that is growing
economic, scientiflic and military strength end
have fewer rather than more difficulties in

34

preserving political stability and an adequate measure of
ideological uniformity. These growing strengths, not offset
by equivalent new weaknesses, will enable its leaders to
devote greater rather than smaller resources and political
detennine.tion to achieving the worldwide purposes that have
been proclaimed in an evolving pattern ~f interpretation by
Lenin and Stalin and new by Khrushchev. 4
Most important is that Khrushchev, himself, admits no basic change in
the system and he is the designer for the new structure built on
the old foundation of Stal inism.

In 1961 he stated:

"The cult of

personality was a superficial boil on the perfectly healthy organism
of our pa rt Y• 11 125

His speech given on M1arch 8, 1963, reaffirmed

this basic policy:
Having eradicated the consequences of the personality cult of
Stalin, the Communist Party has removed all obstacles to the
initiative and activity of the working masses, and has created
the best possible conditions for the development of the
creative forces of the people • • • • A new period in the life
of the Pa.rty and the people has arrived • • • • But this does
not mean that now, after the condemnation of the personality
cult, the time has come for laissez-faire, that the reins of
government have supposedly been loosened, that the public ship
is sailing according to the will of the waves, and that
everyone can act on his aim as he pleases. No. The party·.
has been following and will continue to follow, consistently
and firmly, the Leninist course that it has fashioned,
Implacably rejecting any ideological vacillation and attempts
to violate the norms of life of our society.1 26
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